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ABSTRACT: Recently, many empirical studies have shed light on the 
determinants of boards of directors. Our aim in this paper goes far from the 
corporate setting. We explain how nonprofits boards are structured. As 
opposed to corporations’ goals, the objectives of nonprofits are non-
lucrative. They can not disburse profits to their contributors, but the role 
played by their boards of trustees in monitoring and advising managers is 
analogous to that of boards of directors. Using a sample of Spanish 
foundations, we show that nonprofit board determinants, such as 
organizational complexity and financing structure, are mostly similar to 
those of corporate boards. Nonprofit age, however, illustrates the different 
nature of these organizations and their voluntary boards. 
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Academic research over recent years has addressed several questions 
about size, structure and functioning of corporate boards. Further, despite a 
growing body of literature on corporate and nonprofit boards, little is 
known about an optimal composition to maximize organizational 
efficiency. We are only aware of normative recommendations regarding 
optimal board size and composition (see Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Dawson and Dunn, 2006) and our understanding of board effects on 
organizational performance is still limited (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Baghat and Black, 1999).  
In general, all these papers have failed to link board characteristics to 
organization attributes and context. Boards are not exogenous mechanisms 
but rather an endogenous response to the agency problems inherent in the 
governance of all organizations (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Recently, 
some authors have begun to examine the determinants of the size and 
composition of these boards in the corporative area (Kieschnick and 
Moussawi, 2004; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2004; Yang, Linck and Netter, 
2004; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2005).  
Taking this as our starting point, we study the determinants of boards 
governing organizations far from the business world: nonprofit entities. We 
specifically examine the size and composition of boards of foundations. 
Foundations are independent entities with their own board and which, by 
express wish of the founders, have their endowment tied to the pursuit of 
objectives of general interest. European foundations allocate annually more 
than 51.000 million Euros to their activities (EFC, 2005). Although their 
objective is not the maximization of shareholders’ value but rather the 
attainment of certain statutorily established goals, their governing 
mechanism par excellence, the board of trustees, fulfils certain functions 
similar to those of the boards of directors: strategy and monitoring (Van der 
Bergue and Levran, 2004).  
Previous literature about board determinants can be grouped into 
three major blocks. In the first place, papers in which the organizational 
complexity is understood as an essential determinant of the board (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Denis and Sarin, 1999; Lehn et 
al., 2004; Linck et al., 2005). In the second place, research which conceives 
the board as a result of a negotiation between the manager and outsider 
board members (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Baker and Gompers, 2003; 
Lehn et al., 2004; Raheja, 2005). And, finally, papers which relate board 
characteristics to the specific monitoring conditions of the activity 




(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Raheja, 2005; Linck et 
al., 2005).  
Following these arguments, the structure of the board is derived from 
the costs and benefits of its double role: managerial monitoring and 
advising. Nevertheless, there exists a direct determinant of board 
composition which has not been included in the previous argument: 
ownership structure. In corporations, board composition reflects ownership 
structure because stakeholders exercise their legal rights of control through 
the board (Denis and Sarin, 1999). For nonprofits like foundations we 
cannot make the same claim.  
Nonprofit organizations are characterized by a legal restriction on the 
disbursement of profits. The so-called “nondistribution constraint” implies 
that people supporting nonprofits through voluntary contributions are not 
their residual claimants. Donors do not explicitly gain control rights over 
the nonprofit they finance. Nonprofits lack owners, but they do have 
boards, which have control rights. “These boards are often partially 
composed by and their representatives” (Glaeser, 2003:1). Foundations, 
given their special legal status, also include on their boards those 
individuals and institutions which set them up: founders. Therefore, the 
figure of the owners in corporations is replaced by founders and donors 
whose contributions are indispensable for the foundations’ survival. The 
structure and type of donors and founders should be considered when we 
define the characteristics of a nonprofit board.  
To sum up, in this paper, together with the arguments about the 
organizational complexity, the negotiation between managers and 
contributors and the conditions of monitoring, we incorporate the structure 
of donors and founders as participants whose interests must be represented 
on the board of trustees. Far from the corporate setting, our paper presents 
some of the first pieces of evidence about the board determinants of 
nonprofit organizations. Using a sample of Spanish foundations we show 
that their board size and independence is positively related to the volume of 
funds they handle. We also find a non-linear relation between the board 
size and independence and the organizations’ age. Finally, the percentage 
of outsiders in the board is positively related to the leverage of the 
foundation and negatively linked to its growth opportunities and the 
alignment of interests between donors and managers. The development of 
these arguments and results is structured as follows. First, we introduce the 
role of the board of trustees in the nonprofit organizations and we define 
the hypotheses concerning the determinants of their characteristics. Then, 
we contrast the hypotheses proposed for a sample of Spanish foundations 




and, lastly, we present the conclusions obtained from the empirical 
analysis.  
 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND DETERMINANTS OF THEIR 
BOARDS 
 
According to agency theory, all organizations (for profit or not) are a 
nexus of contracts between different participants in the development of an 
activity. These contracts, or internal rules of the game, specify the nature of 
the residual decision and control rights of an organization and their 
assignation in the different stages of decision making.  
Nonprofit organizations have decision systems that separate the 
management (initiation and implementation) and control (ratification and 
monitoring) of decisions. These systems can only survive when they ensure 
that donations are used effectively and are not easily expropriated. Any 
possible expropriation of donations by residual claimants is prevented by 
the nondistribution constraint. However, the incentives of other internal 
agents to expropriate donations remain (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
The separation of the management and control of decisions in the 
nonprofits implies the delegation of the decision management to one or 
various internal agents. Nevertheless, those decision agents with the 
greatest responsibility are chosen, monitored and evaluated by boards. 
Nonprofit organizations protect the interests of the donors and founders 
with a governing body similar to the board of directors: the board of 
trustees.  
Boards of trustees defend the interests of the founders, donors, 
beneficiaries and the society in general. They are at the top of decision 
control systems of every kind of nonprofit organization. In the case of 
foundations, trustees are responsible for accomplishing the founding goals 
and administering diligently its rights and resources maintaining their 
performance and utility.  
The responsibilities and functions of the board allow the 
establishment of a parallelism between the characteristics of the board of 
trustees and those of the board of directors. The literature regarding boards 
of directors has centered on the analysis of two of their basic 
characteristics: size and independence. With respect to the size, a board 
composed of many directors and with a high percentage of outsiders has a 




large amount of information, which is an enriching factor for the 
performance of their monitoring and advisory function (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1993). However, on the largest boards the decision-making 
cost increases due to coordination and free rider problems (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993).  
With respect to the independence of the board, this has traditionally 
been linked to a greater monitoring objectivity (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
However, the presence of insiders on the board offers direct access to the 
internal information of the organization which is vital for correctly 
monitoring and advising the management (Adams and Ferreira, 2006).  
To sum up, the ideal composition and size of any board is the result 
of a progressive adjustment to the needs of the organization. Below, we 
present a series of hypotheses which reflect the adaptation of the boards to 
the organizational activity, to their particular characteristics and to the 
overall interests which must be represented.  
 
HYPOTHESES FOR FOUNDERS AND MAJOR DONORS 
 
In spite of the costs which stem from a large board, the stakeholders 
demand that their interests are represented on the board of directors, thus 
increasing the size of the board and its independence. On the one hand, 
when there exists a blockholder, this usually leads to a reduction of the 
number of directors which diminish decision making costs (Kieschnick and 
Moussawi, 2004). On the other hand, a blockholder often encourages the 
inclusion of outsiders on the boards increasing their amount of information 
and independence (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Kieschnick and Moussawi, 
2004).  
In nonprofits such as foundations, membership to the board and, 
therefore, the right to vote, does not stem directly from the contributions 
carried out. Explicit rights do not exist for becoming a member of the board 
but its size grows whenever it needs to include more concerned 
stakeholders (Pfeffer, 1973; Abzug et al., 1994). We can expect that major 
founders and donors will be interested in being trustees of the board.  
Large institutional and public donors encourage the organizations 
which they finance to create effective boards which support transparency 
and good governance (O’Regan and Oster, 2002). Thus, both types of 




stakeholder will promote a reduction of the number of trustees and an 
independence increase.   
H1. The greater a founder’s endowment or the greater a donor’s 
contribution, the smaller will be the size of the board and the greater the 
percentage of outsiders.  
 
HYPOTHESIS FOR THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
ACTIVITY 
 
The organizational structure is related to the scope and complexity of 
the organization’s activity. Many nonprofit organizations specialize in the 
supply of outputs whose quality is difficult to evaluate. Thus, the 
hypothesis regarding the complexity of the organizational activity is 
especially appropriate for characterizing the nonprofit environment.  
Both in nonprofit and for profit arenas, those organizations which are 
the biggest and which have the most complex productive processes require 
more hierarchical structures (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The boards of these 
large entities need a greater flow of information in order to perform their 
functions adequately.  
An organization is more complex when its size is large or its sectors 
of activity are multiple. An entity which expands geographically or pursues 
a strategy of diversification needs to recruit directors, normally outsiders, 
with specific knowledge and information concerning the areas of expansion 
(Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Baker and Gompers, 2003; Lehn et al., 2004).  
Additionally, associated with the processes of growth or 
diversification, it is usual to increase the leverage of the organization. A 
complex financial structure, in terms of debt, also supposes an increase in 
the need for knowledge and information on the board. The entities with a 
high level of debt obtain great benefits from the inclusion of financial 
experts on the board (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Booth and Deli, 1999).  
Lastly, the organizational complexity grows at the same time as the 
organization’s age, although not lineally: i.e., it only increases at the initial 
stage of the organization’s life and then it is maintained or reduced once 
“maturity” is reached (Linck et al., 2005).  




H2. The greater the operative or financial complexity of the 
foundation’s activities, the greater will be the size of the board and the 
percentage of outsiders.  
 
HYPOTHESIS FOR NEGOTIATION BETWEEN MANAGERS AND 
OUTSIDERS 
 
If the proportion of insiders and outsiders is the result of a process of 
negotiation between the general manager and the principal stakeholders 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), the level of representation of the 
managers in the board depends on their negotiating power (Arthur, 2001). 
In the corporate setting, when the executive team owns a high percentage 
of shares in the company, their negotiating power as active members of the 
board increases and their propensity to consume perquisites decreases 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In these cases, there is an alignment of 
interests between principals and agents, so the need for monitoring is 
reduced at the same time as the percentage of outsiders (Bhatala and Rao, 
1995; Linck et al., 2005) and the size of the board (Raheja, 2005). 
The absence of lucrative objectives in foundations does not ensure 
that the interests of the residual claimants (founders and donors) and agents 
coincide. Moreover, the altruistic behavior of many of their managers does 
not make them perfect agents (Jensen, 1994) for donors and founders.  
Only when the manager was also a founder or is currently a donor 
we can assure a convergence of interests between the principals and agents 
of a nonprofit. In this case, the necessity for strict monitoring is reduced 
and so the proportion of outsiders.  
H3. The greater the alignment of interests between principals and 
managers, the smaller will be the size of the board and the percentage of 
outsiders.  
 
HYPOTHESIS FOR GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
 
When an organization develops its activities in a noisy environment, 
i.e., with a high level of uncertainty and information asymmetries, 
monitoring costs increase considerably (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 




Although nonprofit organizations usually produce highly complex outputs 
in environments characterized by strong information asymmetries 
(Hansmann, 1980), those entities which are financed from their economic 
activity are the ones most exposed to the risks of the environment and the 
ones which can most take advantage of the growth opportunities. The 
financial survival of these nonprofits depends on their capacity to discover 
and take advantage of growth opportunities in the environment in which 
they operate. Their connection with the organizational context is much 
closer than that of the nonprofits whose resources come from the financial 
investment of their endowment or from the donations drawn from their 
fundraising efforts. In a nonprofit financed from its economic activity the 
adaptation of the board to the environment is essential for their endurance.  
In the noisy contexts, the inclusion of a high number of outsiders on 
the board is not an adequate strategy for increasing their effectiveness 
(Denis and Sarin, 1999; Raheja, 2005). The specific information which is 
handled in a volatile environment is difficult and costly to transmit to 
outsiders. However, the management flexibility necessary for taking 
advantage of perceived growth opportunities is hampered by the 
excessively deliberated decision processes of outside directors and, in 
general, the processing and communication costs increase at the same time 
as the number of directors increases (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  
H4. As the growth opportunities of an entity increase, the size of the 
board and the percentage of outsiders decrease.  
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPANISH FOUNDATIONS 
 
Having presented the hypotheses, we will now briefly discuss our 
sample and the methods for collecting the data. Given that nonprofit sector 
depends essentially on the economic and human resources voluntarily 
contributed by the citizens, we would expect the nonprofit organizations to 
have a high level of transparency and visibility. In Spain, however, most 
nonprofits have adopted a posture of suspicion and concealment of 
information. Also, official public registers do not provide free access to 
complete data on nonprofits and neither are there any private source of 
information as it could be Guidestar. Specifically, in the Spanish 
foundation sector, all the monographic studies carried out during the 1990’s 
and up to the present date detect and reprove the lack of information in the 




sector and the opacity of the foundations (Ruiz, 2000; Garcia, Jimenez, 
Saez and Viaña, 2004). 
This lack of secondary information databases concerning Spanish 
nonprofit organizations obliged us to go directly to primary sources for the 
empirical study. We used a postal questionnaire to obtain the necessary 
data for our research. In October, 2004, we sent over 2.200 questionnaires 
ignoring ex ante if all of them continued running. Garcia et al. (2004) point 
out that more than two thirds of the Spanish foundations are inactive 
entities, despite continuing inscribed in a public register. Therefore, our 
operative population was significantly reduced to about 645 active entities.  
We sent the questionnaires by mail and later by e-mail when it was 
available. Additionally every foundation belonging to the Spanish 
Association of Foundations where also contacted by phone. After all, we 
get 144 responses (104 with complete information), which represents an 
answer rate of about 22% over the expected active population (16% if we 
consider only complete questionnaires). In economic terms our sample is 
even more significant, the 104 foundations included in this study managed 
more than 308 million Euros in 2003, a third of the almost 926 million 
Euros spent by those Spanish foundations which participated in the study of 
the European Foundation Centre (EFC, 2005).  
 
VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE 
 
The general description of the sample as well as the different 
variables used for contrasting the hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.  
 
[table 1 here] 
 
The average size of the board in our sample rises to 12 trustees 
which is similar to the Australian boards (Steane and Christie, 2001) 
although somewhat lower than the average size (16-19 trustees) of the 
board of a North American nonprofit (O’Regan and Oster, 2005). Although 
more than half of our sample lacks insiders in their boards of trustees, the 
average independence of the boards of Spanish foundations is lower than 
that shown by American studies: 89% of outsiders in the Spanish 




nonprofits compared with 98% of the American boards (Callen, Klein and 
Tinkelman, 2003).  
A relevant question also for the understanding of the nonprofits 
under study is the nature and significance of their founders and donors. The 
private institutional founders provide 43% of the total of the initial 
endowment of the entities and 21% of the resources they handled in 2003. 
The percentages are reduced for the public administrations which provided 
13% of the endowment and 18% of the income in the year 2003 (Table 1).  
On average, the foundations analyzed were constituted 12 years ago 
and handle an average of funds close to 3 million Euros, of which 
approximately 20% comes from their economic activity. These nonprofits 
maintain a level of leverage (over fixed assets) of 63% and usually 
specialize in one or two activities.  
On their boards scarcely 3% of the trustees of the foundations are 
simultaneously outsiders and major donors to the entity. We find in the 
sample young foundations in which the principal donors are also managers 
and trustees, combining the functions of decision management and control, 
compared with others in which all the functions are perfectly separated.  
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES.  
 
To contrast the hypotheses presented, we have formulated two 
empirical models, one for the board size and the other for the board 
composition.  
In order to explain the board size: 
SIZEi = α + β1 PUBFOUNDi + β2 INSFOUNDi + β3 PUBDONi + β4 
INSDONi + β5 INCOMEi + β6 DEBTi + β7 DIVERSi + β8 AGEi + β9 AGE2i 
+ β10 INTDONORi + β11 GROWTHi + µI 
 
And, to explain the independence of the board: 
OUTSi = α + β1 PUBFOUNDi + β2 INSFOUNDi + β3 PUBDONi + β4 
INSDONi + β5 INCOMEi + β6 DEBTi + β7 DIVERSi + β8 AGEi + β9 AGE2i 
+ β10 INTDONORi + β11 GROWTHi + µI 





In both models we include, as explicative variables, diverse 
measurements of the importance of the major stakeholders (PUBFOUND, 
INSFOUND, PUBDON y INSDON), of the organizational complexity 
(INCOME, DEBT, DIVERS, AGE, AGE2), of the alignment of interests 
(INTDONOR) and of the growth opportunities (GROWTH).  
The explanatory model of the size is estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) while in the case of independence we employ the tobit 
analysis. The nature of our OUTS variable, with 58% of its observations 
concentrated on its upper limit value, can not be estimated by an OLS 
model but it requires the utilization of a hybrid analysis. Tobit is a hybrid 
between the probit and the multiple regression which not only considers the 
values of the intermediate variables but also the occurrence probability of 
the limit values (Tobin, 1958).  
 
RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATIONS  
 
The results of the board size model (SIZE) are shown in Table 2. The 
explanatory capacity of the overall model is acceptable, but only some of 
the variables used to measure the extent and complexity of the activities are 
clearly significant. Specifically, we refer to the size (INCOME) and the age 
(AGE and AGE2) of the organization.  
 
[table 2 here] 
 
On the one hand, as in the corporate sector (Denis and Sarin, 1999; 
Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Lehn et al., 2004; Linck et al., 2005), the greater 
the volume of resources which an organization manages (INCOME), the 
larger is the size of the board. The monitoring of a large (and frequently 
complex) entity requires a greater number of trustees and knowledge which 
compensates for the costs of coordination and free rider in which a large 
board incurs.  
On the other hand, the relationship between the number of years an 
entity has been operating (AGE) and the board size is significant, in the 
way expected. In the first years of a foundation’s life, its organizational 




complexity grows and, with it, the number of directors necessary to 
develop effectively the board functions. However, there exists a point of 
maturity in the entity after which it is not necessary for the structure to 
become more complex in order to provide for its necessities (Linck, et al., 
2005). At that moment, the number of trustees ceases to grow, as is 
reflected in the negative sign of the size with respect to the quadratic age 
variable (AGE2).  
Although the significance of the estimator is low, the results also 
show indications which imply that the presence of an institutional donor 
(INSDON) may be related to a more reduced size (Kieschnick and 
Moussawi, 2004). The institutional donor performs a monitoring function 
in the nonprofit which is financed and reduces the need for monitoring on 
the part of the board. His presence as a substantial donor in a foundation 
encourages the formation of a small-sized board, as is recommended by 
“best practices” of governance. The negative relationship between 
donations and board size is maintained in the case of public donors 
(PUBDON) although no evidence exists to support this finding.  
With respect to board independence (OUTS), the results are 
considerably more significant than those obtained for the size (see table 3). 
These results agree with earlier studies such as those of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998), Bathala and Rao (1995) or Linck et al. (2005). All of 
these authors limit their analyses to the board composition or propose a 
smaller number of hypotheses regarding the size of the board.  
 
[table 3 here] 
 
In the first place, the relationship between the organizational 
complexity (INCOME) and the percentage of outsiders presents a positive 
sign as we expected (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Lehn et al., 2004; Linck et al.. 
2005). Parallel to what happens in firms, those organizations which receive 
a large quantity of resources and which, supposedly, carry out a greater 
volume of activity, introduce more outsiders onto their boards.  
With regard to financial complexity (DEBT), the coefficient with a 
positive and significant sign also allows us to confirm the hypothesis 
propounded. When a foundation’s leverage is high, more outsiders with 
financial knowledge are included on the board who aid the survival of the 
entity. This result coincides with those of Denis and Sarin (1999) or Linck 




et al. (2005), who obtained a positive relation between the percentage of 
outsiders and the level of company indebtedness.  
With regard to age, the results show a different situation to that in the 
enterprises. As the number of years in operation of the nonprofit increases 
(and also their organizational complexity), the number of outsiders is 
reduced. But, according to the indication of the quadratic variable (AGE2), 
there exists a level from which the trend changes. The composition of the 
board of trustees reflects the life cycle of the nonprofit organizations. 
Initially, boards of trustees are formed from the founders of the entity. 
Nonprofits require a period of maturation before being able to capture 
outsiders who can devote their time freely to the board of trustees. On 
many occasions, although the foundation seeks to include outsiders on their 
board, these do not want to commit themselves until the entity has 
demonstrated its capacity to survive and the sustainability of its goals. The 
board grows during the initial years at the expense of individuals especially 
committed to the organization’s aims who belong to the board and who are 
also managers (insiders). Later, when the reputation of the foundation has 
been demonstrated, new outsiders are captured who increase the 
independence of the organization.  
Besides, the alignment of interests between managers and resource 
donors (INTDONOR) presents a negative and significant coefficient. This 
result leads to a defense of the “negotiation hypothesis”. When the 
managers of an organization are also donors, the divergence of interests is 
reduced and, with it, the need to include outside monitors on the board. Our 
sample, therefore, follows the results obtained in the business literature 
(Denis and Sarin, 1999).  
With respect to growth opportunities, reflected in the importance of 
the economic activity as a source of income for the organization 
(GROWTH), the estimator’s sign is negative and significant. In accordance 
with the corporative research (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Denis and Sarin, 
1999; Lehn et al., 2004; Linck et al., 2005), when a foundation has more 
external opportunities, the percentage of outsiders is lower. We verify that 
the monitoring of entities with high growth opportunities is more costly for 
the outsiders because these opportunities are a reflection of a greater 
uncertainty regarding the organization’s results.  
Lastly, the estimators of the variables introduced for measuring the 
effect of the donors or founders (PUBFOUND, PUBDON, INSDON) also 
show the same trend that other analyses such as Bathala and Rao (1995) or 
Kieschnick and Moussawi (2004) pointed out in the business field. The 
presence of major donors encourages a board composition where the key 




players are the outsiders, but none of these effects has the level of 
significance necessary to draw conclusions which can be extrapolated to 
the rest of the nonprofits.  
 
ROBUSTNESS OF THE ESTIMATIONS  
 
We have evaluated the robustness of the results by introducing into 
the model certain variables that we could not include previously due to 
problems of correlation (i.e. institutional founders) and substituting some of 
the initial variables for other alternative measurements for the same 
concepts.  
In the first of the models we include a variable measuring the weight 
of the institutional founders (INSFOUND). This variable was excluded in 
the original model because of its elevated correlation with the weight of the 
public founders (PUBFOUND) and of the institutional donors (INSDON). 
So, when we add in the institutional founders we took out these two 
variables to avoid multicollinearity problems (Model with institutional 
founders in Table 4).  
 
[table 4 here] 
 
In the second model, we substituted the organizational income 
(INCOME) for nonprofit expenses (EXPENSES). Both of the variables are 
highly correlated and alternatives in the measurement of the concept of 
organizational size (Model with size alternative in Table 4).  
And, lastly, in the third model we substituted total activities 
(DIVERS), which measured the activity diversification of the nonprofit, for 
a variable which combines this type of diversification with the 
geographical expansion (GEODIV). Both variables are relatively correlated 
and measure alternatively the organizational complexity by means of the 
diversification (Model with geographical dispersion in Table 4).  
As we expected, main results of the analysis do not change on 
introducing new variables or modifying the measurement of others. The 
conclusions drawn from the models are, therefore, consistent for the sample 
studied and also for other Spanish foundationsi.  







Overall, using a cross-sectional sample of 104 Spanish foundations, 
we have evidenced that the size and structure of boards of trustees are not 
exogenous. The boards of trustees or directors exists to monitor and advice 
managers so as to reduce the agency costs and to maximize organizational 
value. Their effectiveness in monitoring and advising is derived from a 
balance between the extra information added by recruiting more trustees, 
especially outsiders, and the coordination costs and free rider problems that 
generates their inclusion in the board. So, there is not an optimal 
composition that fits every organization but rather it varies with its 
characteristics. 
Our results show that the size and independence of the board 
increase as the organizations grow and so do their need for supervision and 
counseling. The board composition is also modified as organizations moves 
in its life cycle. Lastly, the independence of the board is positively related 
to the leverage of the organization and negatively connected to its growth 
opportunities and the alignment of interests between donors and managers. 
The evidence we present in this paper is almost like that obtained in 
the corporate sector. However, we provide new insight into the board 
determinants in a context far from the business setting: the nonprofit sector. 
The governance of nonprofit organizations is topic of increasing academic 
relevance not only due to the growth of the sector but also because 
managers of these organizations have a high degree of autonomy. 
Even though most of the determinants of the board of trustees 
confirm the outcomes evinced for the board of directors, the idiosyncrasy 
of nonprofits marks some differences in their board constitution. The 
“nondistribution constraint” avoids any kind of remuneration for their 
trustees, so a frequent reason for them giving time to a board is their 
prestige gaining. Individuals obtain reputation by pertaining to the boards 
of consolidated nonprofits. A lucrative firm with remunerated directors can 
employ prestigious and talented directors from the very beginning. But a 
board of trustees, with voluntary members, is initially composed of those 
founders who also devote their time to running the organization. Later, as 
the entity matures, it gains public confidence, and more competent 
outsiders opt for investing their time in its board. So issues like the life 




cycle affect the independence of the board of trustees opposite to that of the 
board of directors. 
Our paper has implications for both academic research and public 
recommendations about governance. The understanding of board 
characteristics as endogenously determined stimulates the reappraisal of 
those papers which analyse the link between them and the organizational 
efficiency. The failure of previous studies to find robust evidence can be 
due to the treatment of board characteristics as exogenous. Also, when 
codes of best practices recommend smaller and more independent boards 
for every organization they are underestimating that board composition 
depends on the characteristics of the entity. 






                                                 
i Some prior research analyses a potential interdependency between the board size and 
independence for robustness reasons (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Linck, et al., 2005). We 
could correct the endogenous problem using crossed orthogonal variables (Denis and 
Sarin, 1999) obtaining essentially the same results. However we can not use 
simultaneous equations (2SLS) (Linck, et al., 2005) because we would be forced to 
employ OLS for both of our dependent variables losing the advantages of the tobit 
model to estimate the percentage of outsiders. Also, we lack adequate instruments 
(lagged values) to use a tobit model with endogenous covariates. So, we finally decided 
that the benefits of correcting theoretical endogeneity through a 2SLS model or an 
instrumentalized tobit are undermined by a lost in their prediction power when treating 
with a variable as board independence (censured between 0 and 1) and our sample 
(vastly concentrated in 1).  
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Table 1. Hypotheses, variables and descriptive analysis.  
PREDICTIONS OF 
THE HYPOTHESES DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS   
    VARIABLE size independence mean   std. dv. min. max.
Dependant variables:        
 Board size (Total number of trustees – in logarithm) SIZE       ---- ---- 11,98 7,68 3,00 41,00
 Independence (percentage of trustees without executive charge in the foundation) OUTS       ---- ---- 0,89 0,20 0,00 1,00
For the hypothesis regarding founders and major donors::        
 Percentage of initial resources donated by a public institution PUBFOUND negative      positive 0,13 0,32 0,00 1,00
 Percentage of initial resources donated by a private institution (profit-making or not)* INSFOUND       negative positive 0,43 0,47 0,00 1,00
 Percentage of income provided by a public institution in 2003 PUBDON       negative positive 0,17 0,25 0,00 1,00
  Percentage of income provided by a private institution (profit-making or not) in 2003* INSDON       negative positive 0,21 0,30 0,00 1,00
For the hypothesis regarding the complexity of the foundation’s activity:        
 Size of the foundation (total income in millions of Euros – in logarithm) INCOME       positive positive 3,09 7,09 0,00 44,10
 Size of the foundation (total expenses in millions of Euros – in logarithm)  EXPENSE       positive positive 2,97 7,08 0,01 44,70
 Percentage of debt  in relation to the capital of the foundation DEBT       positive positive 0,63 1,78 0,00 14,06
 Activity diversification (number of sectors of activity) DIVERS       positive positive 2,37 1,64 1,00 8,00
 Activity diversification and dispersion (No. sectors x geographical extension)** GEODIV       positive positive 7,49 6,28 1,00 32,00
 Age of the foundation (age of the foundation – in logarithm)*** AGE       positive positive 12,41 12,17 1,00 89,00
For the hypothesis regarding negotiation between managers and outsiders:        
 Alignment of interests (percentage of insiders who are also major donors 2003) INTDONOR       negative negative 0,03 0,08 0,00 0,60
For the hypothesis regarding growth opportunities:        
  Growth opportunities (percentage of income 2003 from economic activity) GROWTH       negative negative 0,20 0,29 0,00 1,00
* We include all private institutions profit-making or not (except individual persons) which is a founder or donor.  
** Geographical dispersion is measured by a categorical variable (1=local; 2=regional; 3=national; 4=international). 
***To contemplate the non-lineal realtionship between age and size or independence of the board, we introduce age variable in the logarithm (AGE) and a quadratic variable 


























Table 2. Econometric model for the board size. 
Model 1: SIZE 
Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares 
Dependant variable: SIZE 
PUBFOUND 0,253946 (0,165) 
PUBDON -0,0164293 (0,944) H1 
INSDON -0,3150068 (0,107) 
INCOME 0,062744 (0,021) 
DEBT -0,0404727 (0,171) 
DIVERS 0,0235206 (0,462) 
AGE 0,7787306 (0,001) 
H2 
AGE2 -0,1642716 (0,001) 
H3 INTDONOR -0,6134683 (0,324) 
H4 GROWTH 0,271525 (0,167) 
 α 0,6614801 (0,103) 
    
No. observations 103 
Prob > F  0,0001 
R squared 0,3033 
Adjusted R squared  0,2276 
The estimation coefficients of the variables are shown with the 























Table 3. Explicatory model for  board independence 
Model 2: INDEPENDENCE 
Method of estimation: Tobit analysis 
Dependant variable: OUTS 
PUBFOUND 0,1222697 (0,350) 
PUBDON -0,2280863 (0,212) H1 
INSDON -0,0631016 (0,670) 
INCOME 0,0330688 (0,119) 
DEBT 0,103535 (0,075) 
DIVERS -0,0245061 (0,284) 
AGE -1,015882 (0,006) 
H2 
AGE2 0,2153111 (0,006) 
H3 INTDONOR -2,111506 (0,000) 
H4 GROWTH -0,3050602 (0,058) 
 α 1,887463 (0,000) 
    
No. observations 103 
Prob > Chi2 0,0000 
Probability Log. -39,3971 
Pseudo R squared 0,3502 
The estimation coefficients of the variables are shown with the levels of 
significance in brackets. 
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Table 4. Models of robustness  
                                     Model 1: SIZE Model 2: INDEPENDENCE 
Method of estimation Ordinary least squares Tobit analysis 
Dependant variable SIZE OUTS 
 




Model 1 with 
alternative size 
(EXPENSE)b 









Model 2 with 
alternative size 
(EXPENSE)b 




PUBFOUND         ----- ----- 0,2571 (0,162) 0,2625 (0,151) PUBFOUND ----- ----- 0,1280 (0,331) 0,1113 (0,394)
INSFOUND            -0,0579 (0,627) ----- ----- ----- ----- INSFOUND 0,0029 (0,975) ----- ----- ----- -----
PUBDON 0,2030         (0,345) -0,0155 (0,948) -0,0033 (0,989) PUBDON -0,1592 (0,339) -0,2324 (0,206) -0,2388 (0,193)
H1 
INSDON        ----- ----- -0,3092 (0,116) -0,3100 (0,110)
H1 
INSDON ----- ----- -0,0622 (0,677) -0,0722 (0,625)
INCOME         0,0780 (0,004) ----- ----- 0,0593 (0,032) INCOME 0,0388 (0,063) ----- ----- 0,0345 (0,110)
EXPENSE    ----- ----- 0,0638 (0,032) ----- ----- EXPENSE ----- ----- 0,0306 (0,180) ----- -----
DEBT -0,0371          (0,217) -0,0412 (0,167) -0,0394 (0,181) DEBT 0,1010 (0,078) 0,1059 (0,072) 0,0977 (0,090)
DIVERS       0,0141 (0,666) 0,0275 (0,388) ----- ----- DIVERS -0,0262 (0,261) -0,0220 (0,331) ----- ----- 
GEODIV           ----- ----- ----- ----- 0,0081 (0,341) GEODIV ----- ----- ----- ----- -0,0068 (0,265)
AGE 0,8140         (0,000) 0,7969 (0,000) 0,7794 (0,000) AGE -0,9471 (0,008) -1,0322 (0,006) -1,0150 (0,006)
H2 
AGE2            -0,1766 (0,001) -0,1664 (0,001) -0,1635 (0,001)
H2 
AGE2 0,1988 (0,009) 0,2196 (0,006) 0,2149 (0,007)
H3              INTDONOR -0,7340 (0,258) -0,6379 (0,307) -0,6101 (0,326) H3 INTDONOR -2,1024 (0,000) -2,1455 (0,000) -2,1111 (0,000)
H4            GROWTH 0,4008 (0,035) 0,2437 (0,217) 0,2742 (0,162) H4 GROWTH -0,2694 (0,073) -0,3096 (0,056) -0,3084 (0,055)
 α 0,3993          (0,307) 0,6144 (0,164) 0,6911 (0,090)  α 1,7369 (0,000) 1,9280 (0,000) 1,8698 (0,000)
                   
No. observations 103 103 103 No. observations 103 103 103 
Prob > F  0,0004 0,0002 0,0001 Prob > Chi2 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
R squared 0,2702 0,2979 0,3061 Prob. logarithm -39,9657 -39,7145 -39,3490 
Adjusted R squared 0,1995 0,2216 0,2307 Pseudo R squared 0,3408 0,3449 0,3510 
The estimation coefficients of the variables are shown with the levels of signification in brackets. 
a In this model we include the INSFOUND variable but, given its high correlation with PUBFOUND and INSDON, we have to omit these two variables. 
b In this model we include the EXPENSE variable as an alternative for measuring the size, omitting INCOME. 
c In this model we include the GEODIV variable as an alternative for measuring the diversification, omitting DIVERS. 
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